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Abstract
The article sheds light on the mediating role of social networks on consumption behaviour, a 
significant facet of social mobility and well-being. Based on the Indian Human Development Survey, 
the article explores to what extent households across India participating in social networks have 
increased their consumption levels. While participation in formal social networks does result in 
improved household consumption levels, the type and number of networks are pivotal to this change. 
Nevertheless, not all networks lead to similar effects, although the number of social networks per se 
has a positive effect on consumption. Furthermore, the networks based on homogeneous groups, 
such as women’s self-help groups, have a negative or lesser effect on smoothing consumption, while 
those affiliated with heterogeneous networks have a positive effect on increasing consumption.
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Introduction
Studies of social mobility have increasingly emphasised the importance of social net-
works as an important tenet of social capital. Most approaches within the social sciences 
treat social capital either as a form of productive asset or as a form of social relations 
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(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Collier, 2002; Marques, 2011; Portes, 1998) exhibiting 
a degree of the liminality of social and economic processes in social mobility. In this 
article, we explore the effects of social networks on consumption behaviour in house-
holds, and we define networks that relate to participation in collectives that are formal in 
nature. Here, social networks as a form of social capital are dynamic, defined as both the 
flow and stock of social relations based on norms and networks which enhance resource 
flow to households, allowing for changes in the consumption behaviour. The second sec-
tion of this article identifies aspects of relationships between social capital, networks and 
household consumption expenditure. The third section discusses the findings from an 
empirical enquiry into the influence of networks on household consumption expenditure, 
based on the National Household Panel Survey in India. The final sections present the 
discussion of results and conclusions.
Social Networks and Consumption Expenditure: 
Conceptual Framework
It is widely acknowledged that social capital is seen as a vital resource unequally distrib-
uted in society, with varying outcomes for different groups in society. Evidence of social 
capital at the macro level shows how trust and civic engagement relate to higher levels 
of growth (Heller, 1996; Krishna and Uphoff, 1999), while at the micro level, individual 
factors such as incentives to invest in social capital such as education, or networks such 
as family or group membership, are significant (Costa and Kahn, 2001). This article 
acknowledges the miscellany of approaches, and identifies the need for a more nuanced 
understanding of the mediating role of social capital in mobility studies. Given the 
exhaustive discussion on social capital in the literature, we only refer to the literature on 
social networks as a form of social capital. Drawing from Portes (1995: 8): ‘Networks 
are important in economic life because they are the sources for the acquisition of scarce 
means, such as capital and information, and because they simultaneously impose effec-
tive constraints on the unrestricted pursuit of personal gain.’ As illustrated by Fedderke 
et al. (1999), forms of social capital (such as networks) display functions of ‘transpar-
ency’ and ‘rationalisation’ allowing for outcomes such as the flow of information and 
reduced transaction costs. For Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 119), social capital can be 
defined as: ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or 
group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relation-
ships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’. Social networks could be distinguished 
from other forms of capital through the element of externality generated by the ‘social’ 
element, involving interaction, which may have economic effects (Collier, 2002). For 
example, Putnam (1993) shows that gaining trust through joining social clubs such as 
amateur choirs generates externalities and reduces transaction costs.
This article draws on social networks as a form of social capital that households 
belong to, based on a wider conception of ‘assets’ (referring to capital) that people both 
possess and use in their daily lives (Bebbington, 1999). This allows us to situate social 
networks as an ‘asset’ (Moser and Dani, 2008) and to analyse the nature and pattern of 
relationships of members of households with key actors such as the state, market and 
community. This pattern of connections reflects a multitude of factors, some operating at 
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the level of the individual, others more at a macro level associated with cultural, eco-
nomic or political dimensions of society (Gilchrist and Kyprianou, 2011; Wetherell, 
2009). This article is more concerned with the micro-level relationship of households 
within the wider sphere of community and civil society.
It is important to parse out elements of density and closure in social networks, that are 
akin to social capital, by embedding social relations within and between social groups 
(Halpern, 2005). The distinction between types, density and strength of networks is rel-
evant here – we refer to two types of capital, that is, bonding networks relate to social 
networks between homogeneous groups operating with common interests, for example 
women’s groups, and bridging networks that include socially heterogeneous groups 
allowing for wider networking and exchange of resources among diverse interest groups. 
Thus, as Fukuyama (1999: 2) states, there is a variation of ‘radius of trust’ between these 
two groups. Further strong ties may exist between homogeneous groups, but may rein-
force exclusive identities and be inward looking; while bridging social capital may be 
based on weak ties, yet more outward looking, comprising people of different social 
cleavages – particularly the much discussed sub-types of bonding and bridging (Gittel 
and Vidal, 1998; Putnam, 2000). Thus, benefits to members of such groups can vary with 
different types of social networking, reverberating the classic distinction between ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong’ ties noted by Granovetter (1973). Further, the type of network and strength 
of ties have an important bearing on information generated and exchanged (Durbin, 
2011), while the types and number of networks play an important role in defining the 
nature of social capital that is generated (Arun et al., 2013). Further, the homogeneity of 
groups may also limit the nature of information and resource flow as all members have 
access to the same networks. This article adopts a ‘connectionist’ view of social capital 
that integrates both the bridging and bonding elements of social capital, the rationale 
being that while it is bonding social capital that assists and supports a household, its 
benefits are limited due to the similar levels of information and resources throughout the 
network. It is only when bridging capital enters that more resources/information are 
brought into the network and distributed, leading to greater outcomes in achieving well-
being. This allows for concerted focus on resource flow through social ties (e.g. Putnam, 
2000), and to see if these two types of network vary in their outcomes for household 
consumption. In the South American context, Godinot et al. (2007) and Perlman (2007) 
show how social networks serving as social and political assets, engendering both agency 
and improving capabilities, enable social mobility. Yet the explorations of the link 
between social networks and consumption, of particular significance to our study, are 
limited to a few studies that focus on individual consumption and leisure practices and 
taste (Warde and Tampubolon, 2002). There is some reference by Marques (2011) to how 
networks affect access to goods and services in São Paulo, where networks may enhance 
or mitigate the effects of poverty through segregation. Other studies show that the mem-
bership of (female) self-help groups has shaped individual consumption practices 
(Trinies et al., 2011).
This article specifically examines how social relationships embedded through social 
networks influence the consumption expenditure of households, through improving 
access to resources, information and opportunities. It is relevant here to draw on the 
concept of social exchange based on the work of Blau (1967), who emphasises the 
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importance of the structure of social position on social life and the formation of different 
networks. Evidence points to the effects of social isolation through resource monopoly 
by the rich (e.g. Blokland and Savage, 2008; Caldeira, 2001) or reduced access to infor-
mation and cultural repertoires by those with lower socio-economic status (Briggs, 
2005), accentuated by different social groupings, as in the case of immigrants in Italy 
(Andreotti, 2006).
In India, social policies play a critical role in the creation of social networks, enabled 
through the co-influences of state, market and family. In India, the Human Development 
Index (HDI) shows an increase of 21 per cent between 1999/2000 and 2007/08 in educa-
tion and health (GOI, 2011), showing increasing levels of welfare and social mobility 
across India. Further, the average monthly per capita consumption expenditure (in real 
terms) in India rose consistently in both rural and urban regions between 2004–05 and 
2009–10, reflected in a reduction in the incidence of poverty. As Shanker and Gaiha 
(2011) found, political and social networks are critical for raising awareness of develop-
ment programmes such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) 
in India that increases information, trust, reciprocity and resource flow. For example, 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999) show how ‘trust’ as a form of social capital is important 
within communities. This article considers whether membership of networks in formal 
organisations produces benefits among different social groups on social, gendered and 
spatial inequalities. This is important as, often, structural power relations lead to biased 
working of patronage networks in resource redistribution. This is also an unintended 
consequence of ‘negative’ social capital, in the sense that poor households are often dis-
advantaged in accessing and deciding key issues that affect them locally. They lack 
favourable ‘allies’ in the social hierarchy of power structures (Dolfsma and Dannreuther, 
2003) and it can be questioned whether social networks as an asset may complement or 
substitute for other productive assets (Chantarat and Barrett, 2012).
In particular, the role of power structures in mediating with an asset base among differ-
ent social groups is relevant in the Indian context. For example, marginalised groups 
either constitutionally recognised as Scheduled Tribes (STs), Scheduled Castes (SCs) or 
minorities such as Muslims, do possess a weaker asset base which is the source of their 
higher levels of poverty (Borooah, 2010; Thorat, 2010). Vanneman et al. (2006) show the 
importance of status groups (defined by caste and religion) on social networks, where 
Brahmins (upper castes) have the most contacts while STs are less connected, and Muslims 
have the fewest contacts. In India, the states of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Assam, comprising the economically 
poor states belonging to the BIMARU group, record an HDI below the national average 
(GOI, 2011). The composition of social groupings within such regions is also important in 
the context of India, as the eight poorest states contain nearly 48 per cent of all SCs, 52 
per cent of STs and 44 per cent of all Muslims in the country. Thus, social grouping also 
influences the levels of economic and social inequality across regions, and observations 
on social interactions between and within such groups are important for this article. In a 
similar vein, women may have access to an increased resource base through networks 
such as self-help groups (SHGs), and this has further implications for household welfare 
(Doss, 2006) with a direct bearing on women’s empowerment (Friedemann-Sánchez, 
2006) and bargaining power (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011; Panda and Agarwal, 2005).
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Against this background, this study examines the effect of social networks on con-
sumption expenditure per se, specifically in relation to: (1) density (number of networks 
that an individual belongs to or number of networks within a society); (2) intensity 
(degree of connections between and within groups); and (3) pay-off (outcomes associ-
ated with groups). However, the potential complexity in measuring the impact of social 
networks weights the value given to different social networks: the weight of varying 
degrees of connections between and within groups; and the effect of a number of social 
networks within a community, participating in a social network and variations in cost and 
demands of social networks. We distinguish between types of network, with varying 
opportunities for generating formal versus informal networks. We ask whether the levels 
and types of social network are significant in improving consumption expenditure, and 
whether this produces similar effects on gender, regions and other social divisions. This 
is because the degree of the knowledge gap depends on: (1) whether the number of social 
networks matters for welfare; and (2) whether participation in any kind of formal net-
work provides a stimulus for policies on social welfare and mobility. Therefore, the main 
objective is to investigate the effect of the number and type of social networks on house-
hold welfare (with consumption expenditure as a proxy) in India.
Methodology and Data
The 2004–05 Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS) is a nationally representative, 
multi-topic survey of 41,554 households in 1503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods 
across India, covering topics concerning health, education, employment, economic sta-
tus, marriage, fertility, gender relations and social capital. It is structured into individual, 
household and village-level datasets, although the household is the unit of analysis for 
the current study (based on the nature of our dependent variable: consumption expendi-
ture per capita), and we rely on a sample of 41,237 households for the analysis. This 
sample constitutes 99 per cent of the sample in the original data set. Although we use the 
household data, some individual and village-level variables were extracted from the 
respective datasets. We estimate the usual determinants of poverty model, but with con-
centration on the effect of: (1) whether a household member belongs to a social network; 
(2) number of social networks affiliated to a household; and (3) type of social network. 
The 2005 IHDS village-level survey gathers information on the presence of 13 social 
networks in a village, including women’s groups such as Mahila Mandal,1 youth club, 
sports group, trade union-professional group, self-help groups, credit or savings group, 
religious or social group, caste association, development group or NGO, agricultural or 
milk cooperative and political network.2 In this article, we choose Mahila Mandal as the 
reference group on the basis that it is the only one that is restricted to women.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation (first and second stage) is used; however, 
results based on a logit model (where the dependent variable is whether the household is 
below the poverty line or not) is provided in Appendix Table 1 for cross-reference. Four 
variants of OLS regression and an instrumental variable model were estimated. First, we 
examine the effect of whether being involved in a social network affects poverty, using a 
dummy response of whether any household member belonged to a social network as the 
main explanatory variable. Second, we capture a social network as a count variable based 
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on the number of social networks that are affiliated to a household. That is, we count the 
number of social networks affiliated to a household based on social network membership 
of individuals in the household. Third, we investigate the quadratic of a number of social 
networks to explore non-linearities between monthly consumption expenditure per cap-
ita and number of social networks. Finally, we examine the effect of different types of 
social network on monthly consumption expenditure per capita.
Other explanatory variables are: rural/urban settlement, household structure and com-
position (size, dependency ratio, the number of working adults and sex of the head), 
whether the household belongs to a scheduled tribe or caste, the number of household 
members with at least higher secondary education, household ownership of land and 
geographical location dummies. For the sake of comparability, we use the same set of 
other explanatory variables (that is, with the exception of our main variable of interest 
– social network) in each of the four models. Also, for ease of interpretation and data 
smoothing, we take the logarithm of monthly consumption expenditure per capita (proxy 
for poverty) in estimating all the models. The results were verified based on mundane 
post-estimation techniques/approaches such as reporting robust coefficients to correct 
for heteroskedasticity, checking for omitted variables using Ramsey’s specification test, 
dealing with non-normality of residuals and inspecting the presence and effect of multi-
collinearity. For the sake of brevity, these tests are not reported in the article. However, 
the current study considers the issue of endogeneity as both theory and empirical work 
suggest that social network capital and poverty (income/expenditure) are bi-causally 
related (Chantarat and Barrett, 2012; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999).
As is the case with all other micro-econometric empirical work that uses Instrumental 
Variable (IV) to address endogeneity, finding an appropriate instrument (defined in the 
context of strength) is always daunting. Although Narayan and Pritchett (1999) deal with 
endogeneity in their estimation, we are sceptical about the strength of the instrument 
used in their article (individual ‘trust’ in various groups). Our scepticism is informed by 
the following: first, the relevance of the instrument. In this context, there is the need to 
examine the strength of an instrument based on the two definitions of weak instruments 
provided by Stock and Yogo (2005). Their viewpoint suggests that weak instrument(s) 
examination should be based on, first, bias of the IV estimator relative to the bias of OLS 
and, second, the value of the alpha level of the Wald test. The latter implies that by 
engaging in IV, the entire model should be examined. The results from Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) show that although the standard error for cluster-level social capital 
reduces in the case of the IV estimation compared to OLS, some of the other variables in 
their model show varying signs and higher standard errors. Among the possible reasons 
for this variation between IV and OLS could be the relevance of the instrument used. 
Second, since conceptualisation of social capital is primarily dependent on both social 
network and ‘trust’ (Paldam, 2000; Vanneman et al., 2006), we remain sceptical of the 
intuition underlying the use of ‘trust’ as an instrument for social network. That is, since 
either social network or ‘trust’ (or both) can be used as a proxy measure for social capital 
and the source of endogeneity is a bi-causal relationship between social capital and pov-
erty, then the use of ‘trust’ as an instrument is difficult to justify.
In this article, we use the number of social networks and other recreational facilities 
in a village as an instrument for the number of social networks affiliated to a household. 
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The justification is that the number of social networks that are affiliated to a household 
will be dependent on the number of social networks in the village, and the latter can only 
be related to household poverty through household members who join social networks. 
From a statistical viewpoint, we test the two conditions of validity based on the Anderson 
canonical correlation LM statistic and Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic. The latter tests the 
null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified (suggesting that the excluded varia-
bles are irrelevant, that is uncorrelated with the endogenous regressor). The Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistic provides several thresholds to facilitate a decision on the extent 
of the weakness of the instrument used. Stock and Yogo (2005) computed critical values, 
suggesting that in the case of one instrument, then the decision rule should be based on 
the value 10. The null hypothesis underlying the ‘weak’ identification test is that the 
equation is weakly identified. In addition to the above test, we perform the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity.
Findings and Discussion
The discussion of results is preceded by a cross-tabulation of the relationship between 
household affiliation to social networks and some selected correlates of social networks 
(Table 1) and descriptive statistics (Appendix Table 1). The last row of Table 1 shows 
Table 1. Household social network affiliation by key correlates.
Correlates Proportion of 
household with social 
network affiliation
Chi-square test
Household is below the poverty 
line
Yes 17.13 160.96 (0.00)
No 82.87
Residence of household Rural 76.42 404.03 (0.00)
Urban 23.58
Household belongs to scheduled 
caste/tribe
Yes 29.88 0.03 (0.86)
No 70.12
Location of household North1  3.73 2.80 (0.00)
BIMARU2 20.53
South3 52.75
East4 22.51
Others5  0.49
Household owns agricultural 
land
Yes 49.22 356.85 (0.00)
No 50.78
Total – 41.24 (17,032) –
Notes:
1North states are Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Uttaranchal and Haryana.
2BIMARU states are Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
3South states are Gujarat, Maharathra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry.
4 East states are Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West 
Bengal Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhatisgarh.
5Other states are Delhi, Goa, Daman & Diu and Dadra+Nagar Haveli.
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that in India, two in every five households have at least one member belonging to a social 
network. The cross-tabulations in Table 1 represent the chi-square test statistic which 
tests the hypothesis of independence between household social network affiliation and 
its correlates. With the exception of the cross-tabulation between scheduled caste/tribe 
and social network, all other associations are statistically significant. The second row of 
Table 1 shows that of the households that are affiliated to a social network, 80 per cent 
are above the poverty line.
The classification of geographical areas is informed by both geographical location 
and poverty, as mentioned above, as the states constituting BIMARU are relatively 
poorer than the other classifications and the category ‘others’ has the least proportion of 
households below the poverty line (less than 1%) based on the 2005 IHDS data (see 
Appendix Table 2). In our analysis, we find that regional differences are also marked, as 
states in the southern regions of the country constitute more than half of the proportion 
of households with at least one member affiliated to a social network. This is an interest-
ing observation as other studies show such regional differences in the coverage of SHGs 
throughout the country, with a stronger presence in southern states such as Andhra 
Pradesh (Raja Reddy and Reddy, 2012). In total there are about 796,000 SHGs, with an 
estimated membership of 97 million (NABARD, 2012). Thus the inequalities in the 
number of social networks across regions may also point to inequalities in levels of eco-
nomic indicators. Further, we find that rural–urban residence is also important as less 
than a quarter of the households with social network affiliation are resident in urban 
areas, showing a lower penetration of networks in rural areas where social divisions 
could be higher.
Table 2 presents the four variants of least squares estimations. Column 2 shows that a 
household with at least one member affiliated to a social network leads to an increase in 
monthly consumption per capita of approximately 11 per cent. Also observed in column 
3 is an increase of approximately 5 per cent in monthly consumption per capita for an 
additional household affiliation with a social network. We further explore potential non-
linearities between the number of social networks and monthly consumption per capita 
in column 4. The negative sign of the square of the number of social networks indicates 
that the observed increases reach only a certain point before decreasing. The calculated 
turning point after which the response to increases in the number of social networks leads 
to a fall in consumption is approximately nine networks. However, we are less optimistic 
about this finding as the number of respondents beyond this point is only 0.06 per cent 
of the entire sample (see Wooldridge, 2009 for further discussion).
Column 4 in Table 2 examines the effect of different types of social network on con-
sumption. We observe that except for self-help group membership, household affiliation 
with all the other networks compared to women-based SHGs (i.e Mahila Mandal) leads 
to higher consumption per capita. Significant variations are observed with the coeffi-
cients of the different types of social network. Compared to Mahila Mandal, households 
with at least one member affiliated with a development agency or an NGO are likely to 
increase their consumption by 20 per cent, while households with caste social network 
associations are able to increase consumption by only 4 per cent.
In line with our hypotheses, we find that factors such as geographical residence, edu-
cational status, size of household and the number of infants impacted on consumption 
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Table 2. Robust regression results of the effect of social networks on poverty (log of monthly 
consumption per capita).
Explanatory variables Least squares estimation Type of 
network 
affiliated to 
household
 Whether 
household is 
affiliated to a 
social network
Number of 
networks 
affiliated to 
household
Square of 
the number 
of networks
Dummy for social network (= 1 
if a household
0.11 – – –
member belongs to at least one 
network)
[17.94]** – – –
Number of social networks – 0.05 0.07 –
 – [20.74]** [12.95]** –
Number of social networks 
squared
– – −0.00 –
 – – [−3.20]** –
Member of youth/sports/
reading1
– – – 0.08
 – – – [5.93]**
Member of trade union/business – – – 0.13
 – – – [9.02]**
Member of self-help – – – −0.07
 – – – [−6.45]**
Member of credit/savings – – – 0.06
 – – – [5.44]**
Member of religion/social – – – 0.07
 – – – [7.88]**
Member of caste association – – – 0.04
 – – – [4.47]**
Member of development/NGO – – – 0.20
 – – – [9.34]**
Member of cooperative – – – 0.10
 – – – [6.29]**
Member of political network – – – 0.05
 – – – [5.25]**
Settlement (= 1 if urban) 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.36
 [52.77]** [53.25]** [53.35]** [51.61]**
Dependency ratio (number of 
infants)
−0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
 [−17.80]** [−17.66]** [−17.62]** [−17.69]**
Household size −0.09 −0.09 −0.09 −0.09
 [−46.73]** [−46.70]** [−46.74]** [−46.81]**
Working members in 
household (number of
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
adults) [13.00]** [12.54]** [12.60]** [12.66]**
 (Continued)
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Explanatory variables Least squares estimation Type of 
network 
affiliated to 
household
 Whether 
household is 
affiliated to a 
social network
Number of 
networks 
affiliated to 
household
Square of 
the number 
of networks
Religion (= 1 if Muslim) −0.04 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
 [−5.14]** [−5.29]** [−5.32]** [−5.77]**
Sex of household head  
(= 1 if male)
0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
 [2.57]* [2.62]** [2.57]* [2.61]**
Scheduled caste/tribe (= 1 if 
household
−0.22 −0.22 −0.22 −0.21
belongs to scheduled caste 
or tribe)
[−33.83]** [−34.09]** [−34.09]** [−33.65]**
BIMARU2,3 −0.46 −0.46 −0.46 −0.47
 [−49.27]** [−49.59]** [−49.63]** [−50.02]**
South4 −0.38 −0.39 −0.39 −0.38
 [−43.11]** [−44.23]**> [−44.33]** [−43.41]**
East5 −0.59 −0.59 −0.60 −0.60
 [−61.31]** [−61.84]** [−61.95]** [−62.29]**
Others6 −0.17 −0.17 −0.17 −0.17
 [−9.73]** [−10.11]** [−10.09]** [−10.05]**
Number of household 
members with at least
0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
higher secondary education) [56.43]** [56.14]** [56.10]** [55.68]**
Land ownership (= 1 if 
household owns agric.
0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
land) [14.23]** [14.66]** [14.51]** [14.49]**
Constant 7.09 7.10 7.10 7.11
 [493.41]** [494.29]** [494.26]** [494.66]**
N 41,237 41,237 41,237 41,012
Adj. R2 0.390 0.392 0.393 0.397
F-statistics 1550.93 1558.98 1457.71 1012.19
Log likelihood −3.4e+04 −3.4e+04 −3.4e+04 −3.4e+04
Notes: t statistics in brackets − + p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
1Reference group for type of social network is member of Mahila Mandal.
2 BIMARU is a dummy variable that takes 1 for BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh).
3Reference category is North.
4South states are Gujarat, Maharathra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry.
5 East states are Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West 
Bengal Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhatisgarh.
6Other states are Delhi, Goa, Daman & Diu and Dadra+Nagar Haveli.
Table 2. (Continued)
per capita with important implications for joining networks. For example, household 
residents in urban areas have a higher consumption per capita than their rural counter-
parts, and households with a greater number of relatively more educated members are 
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able to increase their consumption per capita by about 20 per cent. Finally, larger house-
hold sizes and the number of infants (an indicator of the dependency ratio) are observed 
to reduce the consumption per capita by approximately 9 and 6 per cent respectively. 
Appendix Table 3 shows similar results for the case of logit estimation.
The results of the IV estimation alongside the reduced form model (first stage) are 
presented in Table 3. As already mentioned, the instrument used to address potential bi-
causality between a household, number of social networks, capital and poverty is the 
number of social networks and other recreational facilities in a village. The first-stage 
regression confirms that one of the conditions in identifying an instrument as the coef-
ficient of a number of social networks and other recreational facilities in a village in the 
household number of social networks equation is statistically significant. The IV estima-
tion shows that the number of social networks has a positive effect on consumption per 
capita by a higher magnitude of approximately 21 per cent compared to OLS (this is the 
same as the 20% finding in Table 2). Comparing the effect of all the other explanatory 
variables in the IV estimation with the OLS, the signs and magnitudes do not vary across 
these two estimations.
To verify the strength of the instruments, we present results for both under- and weak 
identification. In both cases, the respective null hypothesis of the instrument being under-
identified and the model being weakly identified are rejected. Furthermore, the test of 
endogeneity confirms the theoretical position that social networks and poverty are bi-
causally related. Finally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the 
OLS yields consistent estimates. On this note, we assert that an additional increase in the 
number of social networks that a household is affiliated to causes consumption per capita 
to increase by approximately 21 per cent. In general our findings show that changes in 
consumption are also determined by the type and number of networks, as the number of 
social networks is observed to be positively associated with monthly per capita con-
sumption expenditure. Of course, not all networks provide equal benefits as households 
with at least one member affiliated with a development agency or an NGO is likely to 
increase its consumption by 20 per cent, those with political networks increase by 5 per 
cent and those with affiliation in a caste-related network are able to increase consump-
tion expenditure by only 4 per cent. More surprisingly the impact of women-based SHG 
membership on household consumption is negative. This could suggest that networks 
through bonding capital, for example, among homogenous or closed groups may provide 
the same level of information among members which may have no impact on their 
household consumption; rather, bridging networks across social groups may improve 
social relations based on norms and networks that spill over to the household, commu-
nity and wider society, and enhance resource flow to households for improved consump-
tion behaviour.
The negative impact of female-based SHG membership on household consumption is 
initially puzzling, but less surprising given the emergent buzz around micro-credit and 
women’s empowerment. In the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Deininger (2013) shows 
how approaches that combine micro-credit with efforts to address specific needs of the 
poor to enhance their economic potential show benefits in empowerment and nutritional 
intake, with some consumption smoothing and income diversification but not asset for-
mation. Evidence on the benefits of such SHG membership of women themselves is 
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Table 3. Robust instrument variable estimation of the effect of social networks on poverty.
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
 Number of social networks 
affiliated to household
Log of consumption per 
capita
 First-stage estimation Second-stage estimation
Number of social networks in 
village (instrument)
0.07 –
 [22.01]** –
Number of social networks 
affiliated to household
– 0.21
 – [9.88]**
Settlement (= 1 if urban) 0.10 0.41
 [5.31]** [46.81]**
Dependency ratio (number of 
infants)
−0.05 −0.05
 [−6.42]** [−13.70]**
Household size 0.02 −0.10
 [6.03]** [−44.60]**
Working members in 
household (number of adults)
0.04 0.03
 [5.62]** [9.25]**
Religion (= 1 if Muslim) 0.06 −0.06
 [3.30]** [−6.04]**
Sex of household head (= 1 if 
male)
0.04 0.02
 [2.30]* [1.91]+
Scheduled caste/tribe (= 1 if 
household belongs to scheduled 
caste or tribe)
0.05 −0.22
 [3.66]** [−32.76]**
BIMARU1,2 0.12 −0.48
 [8.26]** [−48.50]**
South3 0.64 −0.52
 [38.78]** [−27.78]**
East4 0.45 −0.67
 [26.86]** [−47.17]**
Others5 0.00 −0.18
 [0.03] [−10.52]**
Number of household members 
with at least higher secondary 
education)
0.08 0.19
 [10.87]** [45.82]**
Land ownership (= 1 if 
household owns agric. land)
0.14 0.08
 [9.77]** [11.60]**
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Explanatory variables Dependent variable
 Number of social networks 
affiliated to household
Log of consumption per 
capita
 First-stage estimation Second-stage estimation
Constant −0.19 7.09
 [−6.99]** [472.26]**
N 40,658 40,596
Adj. R2 0.105 0.333
F-statistics 294.75 1429.05
Log likelihood −6.3e+04 −3.5e+04
Post-estimation test for instrumental variable estimation
Traditional Hausman – 65.10(0.00)
Under-identification test – 652.06(0.00)
Weak identification test – 662.46(0.00)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman – 66.57(0.00)
Notes: t statistics in brackets − + p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01. Reference group for type of social network is 
member of Mahila Mandal.
1 BIMARU is a dummy variable that takes 1 for BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh).
2Reference category is North.
3South states are Gujarat, Maharathra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry.
4 East states are Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West 
Bengal Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhatisgarh.
5Other states are Delhi, Goa, Daman & Diu and Dadra+Nagar Haveli.
Table 3. (Continued)
questionable as Garikipati (2012) argues that women’s loans through SHGs are often 
used to benefit their men, by enhancing male ownership of the household’s productive 
assets, showing little control on loan-created assets; while Balasubramanian (2013) 
argues that women within households are worse off with micro-credit.
Furthermore, the additional increase in the number of social networks that a household 
is affiliated to also causes consumption per capita to rise. That is, the number of social 
networks per se has a positive effect on consumption per capita. Thus, the type of network 
and strength of ties has an important bearing on the information generated and exchanged, 
particularly as gender plays a key role, creating both weak and strong ties through homog-
enous self-help groups with women from similar backgrounds, but also other kinds of 
network where trust and reciprocity are important for developing such community-based 
solidarity. Participation in such networks has improved levels of well-being through aware-
ness, information source, resource sharing and resilience against vulnerability.
Conclusions
This article sets out to explore the effect of social networks as a vital component of the 
household asset base on consumption levels among households in India. Using IHDS 
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data, the findings indicate that households with participation in social networks improved 
their consumption levels, showing the possibilities of social mobility leading to overall 
well-being and improved welfare. We were also informed by a range of determinants for 
social networks that impacted on consumption per capita such as region, social grouping, 
urban–rural residence and educational status. Our findings show that penetration of 
households into the different types of network is quite high across regions in India, with 
two out of every five households having at least one member belonging to a social 
network.
However, not all networks lead to the same conclusion; this is an interesting observa-
tion whereby membership of different networks yields varying outcomes of consump-
tion. This is perhaps because groups formed on the basis of social identity such as caste 
may focus on social rights or justice rather than on improving economic gains. However, 
bridging networks across social groups may improve social relations based on norms and 
networks that spill over to the household, community and wider society. The negative 
impact of a women-based SHG membership on household consumption needs further 
probing, given the emergent buzz around micro-credit and women’s empowerment.
Further, our findings show that states in the southern area constitute more than half of 
the households with at least one member affiliated with a social network. Less than a 
quarter of households with social network affiliation are residing in urban areas, which 
may pinpoint rural–urban disparities in the distribution of social networks as well as 
higher participation of households. Further, those with higher human capital levels, such 
as education, also seemed to improve their consumption patterns through such social 
affiliations. There is some encouraging evidence that the Human Development Index and 
its component indices have shown convergence across states as the poorer states with a 
high concentration of various marginalised groups are catching up with the national 
average; this strongly suggests that these groups are starting to share the benefits of the 
process of human development, particularly through good governance and massive 
social mobilisation (GOI, 2011).
One of the major findings – that 80 per cent of households affiliated to a social net-
work are above the poverty line – corroborates the evidence that networking is often 
more extensive among upwardly mobile groups; Christakis and Fowler (2010) suggest 
that levels of personal well-being directly relate to position in social network chains. 
This could also be suggestive of the causal relationship between membership of net-
works and impact on welfare or vice versa, as Vanneman et al. (2006) suggest that net-
working is extensive among advantaged groups, suggestive of resource monopoly by the 
well-off (e.g Blokland and Savage, 2008). This is supported by our finding that those 
with political networks also see an increase in consumption, showing their gainful posi-
tion within such networks. The study finds that participating in the number and nature of 
social networks is critical in enhancing an environment through which specific social 
groups can strengthen life choices through improved consumption levels, well-being and 
social mobility.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the Brooks World Poverty Insitute, at the University of Manchester and Dr 
Barbara Evers for comments on an earlier version of the article.
 at Manchester Metropolitan (Y) on September 8, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Arun et al. 15
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or 
not-for-profit sectors. 
Notes
1. Mahila Mandalas are voluntary organisations in India aimed at women’s progress in society 
through providing basic needs such as health, nutrition, education and family welfare, as well 
improving economic benefits through savings groups and economic activities.
2. Political network is based on whether somebody in the household or close to the household is 
an official of the village panchayat/nagarpalika/ward (local administrative units) committee.
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Appendices
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max
Log of consumption per capita 41,237 6.58 0.71 1.39 10.58
= 1 if household is below poverty line 41,237 0.20 0.40 0 1
Number of networks affiliated to household 41,237 0.77 1.21 0 10
Settlement (= 1 if urban) 41,237 0.36 0.48 0 1
Dependency ratio (number of infants) 41,237 0.59 0.90 0 9
Household size 41,237 5.19 2.49 1 38
Number of adults 41,237 2.80 1.38 0 18
= 1 if dominant religion in household is Muslim 41,237 0.11 0.32 0 1
Sex of household head (= 1 if male) 41,237 0.90 0.30 0 1
= 1 if households belong to scheduled caste or tribe 41,237 0.28 0.45 0 1
Location 41,237 2.73 1.02 1 5
Number of household members with at least higher 
secondary education
41,237 0.55 1.00 0 10
= 1 if household own agricultural land 41,237 0.42 0.49 0 1
Number networks in the village 40,913 3.11 3.37 0 13
Table 2. Classification of location by proportion of households below poverty line.
Location Proportion of households below poverty line
North 3.91
BIMARU 34.89
South 28.20
East 32.24
Others 0.75
Total 100
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Table 3. Robust regression results of the effect of social network on poverty  
(= 1 if household is below the poverty line).
Explanatory variables Logit estimation
 Whether household 
is affiliated to a social 
network
Number of 
networks affiliated 
to household
Type of network 
affiliated to 
household
Dummy for social network (= 1 if 
a household member belongs to at 
least one network)
−0.35 – –
 [−11.83]** – –
Number of social network – −0.17 –
 – [−12.11]** –
Member of youth/sports/read7 – – 0.07
 – – [0.96]
Member of trade union/business – – −0.20
 – – [−2.70]**
Member of self help – – 0.24
 – – [4.94]**
Member of credit/savings – – −0.20
 – – [−3.30]**
Member of religion/social – – −0.32
 – – [−6.71]**
Member of caste assoc. – – −0.23
 – – [−4.84]**
Member of development/NGO – – −0.88
 – – [−6.13]**
Member of cooperative – – −0.60
 – – [−5.82]**
Member of political network – – −0.19
 – – [−4.00]**
Settlement (= 1 if urban) 0.19 0.19 0.20
 [5.62]** [5.45]** [5.86]**
Dependency ratio (number of 
infants)
0.23 0.23 0.23
 [13.61]** [13.54]** [13.40]**
Household size 0.27 0.27 0.28
 [29.03]** [28.99]** [29.35]**
Number of working adults in 
household
−0.17 −0.17 −0.17
 [−10.89]** [−10.61]** [−10.84]**
Religion (= 1 if Muslim) 0.23 0.23 0.27
 [5.30]** [5.42]** [6.12]**
Sex of household head (= 1 if 
male)
−0.13 −0.13 −0.13
 [−2.75]** [−2.83]** [−2.81]**
Scheduled caste/tribe (= 1 if 
household belongs to scheduled 
caste or tribe)
0.75 0.75 0.76
 [24.69]** [24.87]** [24.88]**
 (Continued)
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Explanatory variables Logit estimation
 Whether household 
is affiliated to a social 
network
Number of 
networks affiliated 
to household
Type of network 
affiliated to 
household
BIMARU2,3 1.50 1.51 1.58
 [25.19]** [25.27]** [25.88]**
South4 1.18 1.20 1.21
 [19.61]** [19.90]** [19.71]**
East5 1.89 1.89 1.96
 [31.13]** [31.16]** [31.62]**
Others6 0.60 0.62 0.67
 [5.13]** [5.28]** [5.71]**
Number of household members 
with at least higher secondary 
education
−0.71 −0.70 −0.72
 [−25.57]** [−25.46]** [−25.68]**
Land ownership (= 1 if 
household owns agricultural 
land)
−0.25 −0.26 −0.25
 [−7.72]** [−7.97]** [−7.66]**
Constant −3.60 −3.63 −3.72
 [−44.25]** [−44.53]** [−44.94]**
N 41,299 41,299 41,051
Log likelihood −1.7e+04 −1.7e+04 −1.7e+04
Notes
1t statistics in brackets − + p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.
2 BIMARU is a dummy variable that takes 1 for BIMARU states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh).
3Reference category is North.
4South states are Gujarat, Maharathra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry.
5 East states are Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, Assam, West 
Bengal Jharkhand, Orissa and Chhatisgarh.
6Other states are Delhi, Goa, Daman & Diu and Dadra+Nagar Haveli.
7Reference group for type of social network is Member of Mahila Mandal.
Table 3. (Continued)
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